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Security Audit Report — GuardDog Nexus

Date: 2026-05-10
Auditor: Automated security audit
Last updated: 2026-05-11 (consolidated with improvements/final-plan; statuses verified against current codebase)
Scope: Full codebase review — security vulnerabilities, logic errors, missing controls

Summary

Severity Count Fixed Rejected/Accepted Mitigated Open
CRITICAL 5 2 2 1 0
HIGH 7 2 5 0 0
MEDIUM 8 6 0 0 2
LOW 6 4 0 0 2
Total 26 14 7 1 4

14 fixed, 7 closed as rejected/accepted-risk, 1 partially mitigated, 4 remaining open.

CRITICAL (5)

C1. SSRF via webhook downloadUrl ✅ FIXED

Severity: CRITICAL
Fix: NEXUS_ALLOWED_HOSTS env var + _validate_download_url() in core/nexus.py.

Problem: downloadUrl from webhook payload was passed directly to httpx.AsyncClient.get() without validation.

Fix: Validate URL scheme (http/https only), validate hostname against allowed hosts list. Defaults to Nexus hostname if NEXUS_ALLOWED_HOSTS not set.

C2. Webhook secret not enforced by default ❌ ACCEPTED RISK

Severity: CRITICAL
Decision: Internal service; secret is optional. Documented as such.

C3. Default admin credentials ✅ FIXED

Severity: CRITICAL
Fix: Removed BasicAuth from all Nexus API calls (anonymous access).

C4. XSS via LLM report verdict ❌ NOT DANGEROUS

Severity: CRITICAL — downgraded to INFO
Decision: Jinja2 autoescape blocks injection in attributes.

C5. LLM Prompt Injection ⚠️ PARTIALLY MITIGATED

Severity: CRITICAL
Mitigation: System prompt gives priority to system instructions. _validate_report() applies defaults for missing/invalid fields. Raw finding data still in user message.

HIGH (7)

H1. No rate limiting ❌ REJECTED

Severity: HIGH
Decision: Internal service; not exposed to public internet.

H2. Path traversal via download filename ⚠️ LOW RISK

Severity: HIGH — downgraded
Analysis: os.path.basename("../../../etc/passwd") → "passwd", traversal impossible. Risk accepted.

H3. Sensitive data in API (source_ip) ❌ REJECTED

Severity: HIGH
Decision: source_ip and initiator are features. Internal service — acceptable.

H4. No authentication on API ❌ REJECTED

Severity: HIGH
Decision: Internal service; not exposed to public internet.

H5. Memory leak in lock dictionaries ✅ FIXED

Severity: HIGH
Fix: Background cleanup tasks every 30 minutes in main.py for both _url_locks (harvester) and _llm_locks (web). Tasks spawned via asyncio.create_task() in lifespan, gracefully cancelled on shutdown.

H6. Race condition in URL locking ✅ FIXED

Severity: HIGH
Fix: DB re-check (sha256 dedup) happens inside the URL lock critical section, preventing parallel scans of the same asset.

H7. CSV export unbounded ❌ REJECTED

Severity: HIGH
Decision: Acceptable for internal tool. Not exposed to public.

MEDIUM (8)

M1. No LLM response schema validation ✅ FIXED

Severity: MEDIUM
File: core/llm.py:25-28

Fix: _validate_report() applies defaults for missing fields:

  • verdict → "unknown"
  • summary → "No summary provided"
  • analysis → "No analysis provided"
  • severity_rating → "unknown"
  • Also unwraps JSON from markdown code fences (json ... ).

M2. No CSRF protection ⬜ OPEN

Severity: MEDIUM
File: routes/web.py:205-274

Problem: POST /api/v1/findings/{id}/analyze has no CSRF token. While the service is internal, a CSRF attack from the same origin could trigger unwanted LLM analysis.

Suggested fix: Add a CSRF middleware or token check for state-changing POST endpoints.

M3. No security headers ✅ FIXED

Severity: MEDIUM
File: main.py:95-113

Fix: SecurityHeadersMiddleware sets on all responses:

  • X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
  • X-Frame-Options: DENY
  • X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
  • Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
  • Permissions-Policy: geolocation=(), microphone=()

M4. SQLite without WAL mode ⬜ OPEN

Severity: MEDIUM
File: db/engine.py:12

Problem: No PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL — concurrent readers block writers, causing degraded performance under load.

Suggested fix: Add WAL mode in connection setup:

async with _engine.connect() as conn:
    await conn.execute(text("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL"))

M5. Scoped npm packages not supported ✅ FIXED

Severity: MEDIUM
File: core/nexus.py:75-80

Fix: extract_npm_info handles @scope/name scoped packages:

if parts[1].startswith("@"):
    name = f"{parts[1]}/{parts[2]}"
    short_name = parts[2]

M6. Dashboard stats — potential IndexError ✅ FIXED

Severity: MEDIUM
File: routes/api_scans.py:146-148

Fix: Guard checks latest is non-empty and has started_at:

latest[0].started_at.isoformat() if latest and latest[0].started_at else None

M7. Error message HTML escaping ✅ FIXED

Severity: MEDIUM
File: web/templates/scan_detail.html:30

Fix: Jinja2 autoescape handles HTML in scan.error_message. No additional escaping required.

M8. Unknown ecosystem defaults to pypi ✅ FIXED

Severity: MEDIUM
File: routes/webhooks.py:58-69

Fix: _detect_ecosystem() returns None for unknown formats; webhook handler rejects with "unknown_ecosystem" error.

LOW (6)

L1. Dockerfile grep hack ✅ FIXED

Severity: LOW
Fix: Replaced with uv pip install . --system.

L2. Health check without DB ✅ FIXED

Severity: LOW
File: main.py:139-140

Fix: /health/dependencies endpoint checks database connectivity and Nexus API reachability.

L3. No backup strategy for SQLite ⬜ OPEN

Severity: LOW
Risk: Crash → corrupted database → data loss.

Suggested fix: Add documentation for regular backups via cron or a backup script. Consider PostgreSQL for production deployments.

L4. Dead code — parse_package_path ✅ FIXED

Severity: LOW
File: core/nexus.py:113

Resolution: Function is actively used in routes/web.py and routes/api_packages.py. Not dead code.

L5. Hardcoded LLM API base URL ⬜ OPEN

Severity: LOW
File: constants.py:140

Problem: LLM_DEFAULT_API_BASE = "https://api.openai.com/v1" — unexpected API calls for users of local models who forget to set LLM_API_BASE.

Suggested fix: Either log a warning at startup or change default to an empty/required value.

L6. Unknown ecosystem defaults to pypi (webhook) ✅ FIXED

Severity: LOW
File: routes/webhooks.py:62

Fix: Same as M8. _detect_ecosystem() returns None for unknown formats; webhook rejects.

Implementation Plan

Phase 1 — P0 (Critical) — COMPLETED

# Task Status
1 SSRF protection ✅ FIXED
2 Mandatory WEBHOOK_SECRET ❌ ACCEPTED
3 Remove default Nexus credentials ✅ FIXED
4 LLM verdict whitelist + prompt injection ⚠️ PARTIAL
5 Path traversal fix ⚠️ LOW RISK

Phase 2 — P1 (High) — COMPLETED

# Task Status
6 Rate limiting ❌ REJECTED
7 API authentication ❌ REJECTED
8 Memory leak fix for locks ✅ FIXED
9 Race condition fix ✅ FIXED
10 Remove source_ip from public API ❌ REJECTED
11 CSV export auth + limit ❌ REJECTED

Phase 3 — P2 (Medium)

# Task Status
12 LLM response validation (Pydantic/defaults) ✅ FIXED
13 CSRF protection ⬜ OPEN
14 Security headers middleware ✅ FIXED
15 SQLite WAL mode ⬜ OPEN
16 Scoped npm support ✅ FIXED
17 Dashboard None guard ✅ FIXED
18 Reject unknown ecosystem ✅ FIXED

Phase 4 — P3 (Low)

# Task Status
19 Dockerfile deps ✅ FIXED
20 Health check DB ping ✅ FIXED
21 Backup strategy docs ⬜ OPEN
22 Hardcoded LLM API base URL ⬜ OPEN

Remaining Open Items (4)

# Severity Finding Recommendation
M2 MEDIUM No CSRF protection on POST endpoints Add CSRF middleware or token validation
M4 MEDIUM SQLite without WAL mode Add PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL in engine setup
L3 LOW No backup strategy for SQLite Document backup procedures or switch to PostgreSQL
L5 LOW Hardcoded LLM default API base URL Log warning on startup or require explicit configuration

Test Coverage Gaps

The existing 137 tests (101 unit + 36 e2e) do NOT cover:

  • SSRF prevention (malicious downloadUrl)
  • Webhook signature validation with empty secret
  • Path traversal in download URLs
  • Rate limiting on webhook endpoint
  • Authentication on API endpoints
  • LLM prompt injection
  • CSRF protection (M2 — open)
  • Security headers presence
  • SQLite WAL mode behavior

Recommendations

  1. Immediate: No critical items remain open. C1, C3 are fixed; C2, C4 are accepted.
  2. Short-term: Address M2 (CSRF) and M4 (WAL mode) — both are straightforward, low-risk fixes.
  3. Long-term: Address L3 (backup strategy) and L5 (LLM default URL) during routine maintenance.
  4. Ongoing: Add security-focused tests for resolved findings to prevent regressions.

Notes

  • Consolidation: This document supersedes improvements.md and final-plan.md (deleted). All verified fixes from those plans are incorporated.
  • LLM retry: Implemented with exponential backoff (2s, 4s, 8s, max 3 attempts) in core/llm.py:126-152.
  • Lock cleanup: Background tasks in main.py:59-75 clean up _url_locks and _llm_locks every 30 minutes.
  • Race condition: SHA256 dedup check runs inside URL lock critical section in harvester.
  • Scoped npm: extract_npm_info in core/nexus.py:75-80 handles @scope/name packages.
  • Dashboard guard: routes/api_scans.py:147 checks latest and latest[0].started_at before access.