docs: sync documentation with latest changes (168 tests, metrics, Makefile, pre-commit)

.dockerignore

@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@ data/
 examples/
 scripts/
 skills-lock.json
+.tmp/

.gitignore

@@ -18,3 +18,5 @@ dashboard-*.png
 scans-*.png
 scan-*.png
 dashboard-*.png
+
+.tmp/

.opencode/plans/final-plan.md

@@ -1,140 +0,0 @@
-# GuardDog Nexus - Final Improvement Plan (v2)
-
-## STATUS: IMPLEMENTED AND VERIFIED
-
-All planned changes have been implemented and verified.
-
-**Test Results:** 101 passed, 0 failed
-**Linting:** All checks passed
-**Format:** Code formatted with ruff
-
----
-
-## Verified Issues & Fixes
-
-### Issue 1: Lock Dictionary Memory Leak (CONFIRMED)
-**Location:** `core/harvester.py` line 25, `routes/web.py` line 32
-
-**Verified:** `_url_locks` and `_llm_locks` dictionaries are created but only popped in specific code paths:
-- `harvester.py:64` - only when URL is already locked
-- `harvester.py:81` - only after DB check completes
-- `web.py:248` - only when lock is already locked
-
-**Missing cleanup paths:**
-- When scan completes normally (lock popped but never checked for removal)
-- When exception occurs (lock may remain)
-- No periodic cleanup task exists
-
-**Fix:** Add background cleanup task that runs every 30 minutes:
-```python
-async def _cleanup_unused_locks():
-    while True:
-        await asyncio.sleep(1800)  # 30 minutes
-        for key in list(_url_locks.keys()):
-            if not _url_locks[key].locked():
-                _url_locks.pop(key, None)
-```
-
-### Issue 2: LLM Response Parsing Edge Case (CONFIRMED)
-**Location:** `core/llm.py` line 81
-
-**Verified:** The code handles `KeyError` and `IndexError` but doesn't handle the case where `body["choices"]` is an empty list. The try-except at line 83 catches these, but the error message logging at line 98-102 tries to access the same path again, which could raise a different exception.
-
-**Fix:** Extract the raw content safely first:
-```python
-try:
-    choices = body.get("choices", [])
-    if not choices:
-        raise ValueError("Empty choices list")
-    message = choices[0].get("message", {})
-    content = message.get("content", "")
-    if not content:
-        raise ValueError("Empty message content")
-    return json.loads(content)
-except (ValueError, json.JSONDecodeError) as e:
-    # Log and return None
-```
-
-### Issue 3: Missing LLM Retry Logic (CONFIRMED)
-**Location:** `core/llm.py`
-
-**Verified:** No retry mechanism exists. Single failure = no analysis for that finding.
-
-**Fix:** Add configurable retry with exponential backoff:
-```python
-async def analyze_finding(finding_data: dict, max_retries: int = 3) -> dict | None:
-    for attempt in range(max_retries):
-        try:
-            result = await _attempt_llm_call(finding_data)
-            if result:
-                return result
-        except Exception as e:
-            if attempt < max_retries - 1:
-                await asyncio.sleep(2 ** attempt * 2)  # 2s, 4s, 8s
-                continue
-            log.error("LLM analysis failed after %d attempts: %s", max_retries, e)
-    return None
-```
-
-### Issue 4: No Dependency Health Checks (CONFIRMED)
-**Location:** `main.py`
-
-**Verified:** Only `/health` endpoint exists, returns static status. No checks for:
-- Database connectivity
-- Nexus API availability
-- LLM endpoint availability
-
-**Fix:** Add `/health/dependencies` endpoint with actual checks.
-
-### Issue 5: Harvester Early Return Without Cleanup (PARTIALLY CONFIRMED)
-**Location:** `core/harvester.py` line 78
-
-**Verified:** When `active` scan is found at line 76, the function returns `None` immediately. The `finally` block at line 79-81 does execute and removes the lock, but this happens before the actual scan work begins.
-
-**Impact:** Lower than initially assessed - the DB check provides adequate protection against duplicate scans.
-
----
-
-## Refined Implementation Priorities
-
-### Phase 1: Critical Fixes (1-2 days)
-1. Add LLM retry logic with exponential backoff
-2. Fix LLM response parsing edge cases
-3. Add dependency health checks
-
-### Phase 2: Reliability (2-3 days)
-4. Add lock cleanup task
-5. Add configuration validation on startup
-6. Add proper error handling for all subprocess calls
-
-### Phase 3: Code Quality (1-2 days)
-7. Add type hints consistency
-8. Add input validation for webhooks
-9. Add security event logging
-
-### Phase 4: Features (2-3 days)
-10. Add scan progress tracking
-11. Sync CSV export filters with API
-12. Add rate limiting for webhook processing
-
----
-
-## Verification Checklist
-
-After each phase:
-- [ ] `ruff check guarddog_nexus tests` passes
-- [ ] `python3 -m pytest -v` passes all 85 tests
-- [ ] `ruff format guarddog_nexus tests` applied
-- [ ] Manual Docker Compose test
-- [ ] Review changes for regressions
-
----
-
-## Summary
-
-The project is well-structured with good separation of concerns. The main areas needing attention are:
-1. **Resource management** - lock cleanup, subprocess handling
-2. **Reliability** - LLM retries, health checks, error recovery
-3. **Code quality** - type consistency, validation, logging
-
-Total estimated effort: 1-2 weeks for all improvements.

.opencode/plans/improvements.md

@@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
-# GuardDog Nexus - Improvement Plan
-
-## Status Check: Completed Analysis
-
-After thoroughly reviewing the codebase, I've identified several areas for improvement. Below is the prioritized plan.
-
----
-
-## Priority 1: Critical Bug Fixes
-
-### 1.1 Fix Harvester Race Condition (T4)
-**File:** `guarddog_nexus/core/harvester.py`
-**Issue:** Lines 56-81 have a race condition where the URL lock cleanup happens in a `finally` block while the lock check happens before acquisition.
-
-**Current problematic flow:**
-```python
-# Line 56-65: Check if locked
-async with _url_lock:
-    if download_url not in _url_locks:
-        _url_locks[download_url] = asyncio.Lock()
-
-lock = _url_locks[download_url]
-if lock.locked():
-    # Skip...
-    async with _url_lock:
-        _url_locks.pop(download_url, None)  # Line 64
-    return None
-
-async with lock:
-    # ... work ...
-    finally:
-        async with _url_lock:
-            _url_locks.pop(download_url, None)  # Line 81
-```
-
-**Fix:** Ensure lock cleanup only happens after successful work completion, not on early returns.
-
-### 1.2 Fix LLM Response Parsing (T4)
-**File:** `guarddog_nexus/core/llm.py`
-**Issue:** Line 81 assumes `body["choices"][0]["message"]["content"]` exists without validation.
-
-**Fix:** Add proper error handling:
-```python
-try:
-    choices = body.get("choices", [])
-    if not choices:
-        raise ValueError("No choices in response")
-    message = choices[0].get("message", {})
-    content = message.get("content", "")
-    return json.loads(content)
-except (KeyError, IndexError, json.JSONDecodeError) as e:
-    ...
-```
-
----
-
-## Priority 2: Reliability Improvements
-
-### 2.1 Add LLM Retry Logic (T4)
-**File:** `guarddog_nexus/core/llm.py`
-**Issue:** Failed LLM calls have no retry mechanism.
-
-**Fix:** Add exponential backoff retry:
-```python
-async def analyze_finding(finding_data: dict, max_retries: int = 3) -> dict | None:
-    for attempt in range(max_retries):
-        result = await _attempt_analysis(finding_data)
-        if result:
-            return result
-        if attempt < max_retries - 1:
-            await asyncio.sleep(2 ** attempt)
-    return None
-```
-
-### 2.2 Add Dependency Health Checks (T4)
-**File:** `guarddog_nexus/main.py`
-**Issue:** No health checks for database or external dependencies.
-
-**Fix:** Add `/health/dependencies` endpoint:
-```python
-@app.get("/health/dependencies")
-async def health_dependencies():
-    checks = {
-        "database": await _check_db_health(),
-        "nexus": await _check_nexus_connectivity(),
-    }
-    status = 200 if all(checks.values()) else 503
-    return JSONResponse(status_code=status, content=checks)
-```
-
-### 2.3 Fix Lock Cleanup (T4)
-**Files:** `guarddog_nexus/core/harvester.py`, `guarddog_nexus/routes/web.py`
-**Issue:** `_url_locks` and `_llm_locks` dicts grow indefinitely.
-
-**Fix:** Add periodic cleanup using `asyncio.create_task()`:
-```python
-async def _cleanup_locks():
-    while True:
-        await asyncio.sleep(3600)  # Every hour
-        for key in list(_url_locks.keys()):
-            if not _url_locks[key].locked():
-                _url_locks.pop(key, None)
-```
-
----
-
-## Priority 3: Code Quality
-
-### 3.1 Add Type Hints Consistency (T1)
-**Files:** Multiple files
-**Issue:** Inconsistent use of `dict` vs `Dict[str, Any]` type hints.
-
-### 3.2 Add Input Validation (T4)
-**File:** `guarddog_nexus/routes/webhooks.py`
-**Issue:** Limited validation of webhook payload structure.
-
-**Fix:** Add validation for required fields before processing.
-
-### 3.3 Add Logging for Security Events (T4)
-**Files:** `guarddog_nexus/core/harvester.py`, `guarddog_nexus/routes/webhooks.py`
-**Issue:** Security-related events not logged at appropriate levels.
-
-**Fix:** Add WARNING/CRITICAL logging for:
-- Failed authentication attempts
-- Suspicious package patterns
-- Rate limiting triggers
-
----
-
-## Priority 4: Feature Enhancements
-
-### 4.1 Add Scan Status Tracking (T4)
-**File:** `guarddog_nexus/core/harvester.py`
-**Issue:** No visibility into scan progress for long-running packages.
-
-**Fix:** Add intermediate status updates via WebSocket or polling endpoint.
-
-### 4.2 Add Configuration Validation on Startup (T1)
-**File:** `guarddog_nexus/config.py`
-**Issue:** Invalid configurations discovered only at runtime.
-
-**Fix:** Add validation in `Config.__post_init__()`:
-```python
-def __post_init__(self):
-    if not self.nexus_password:
-        raise ValueError("NEXUS_PASSWORD is required")
-    if self.llm_enabled and not self.llm_api_key:
-        raise ValueError("LLM_API_KEY required when LLM_ENABLED=1")
-```
-
-### 4.3 Add CSV Export with Filters (T4)
-**Files:** `guarddog_nexus/routes/api_scans.py`, `guarddog_nexus/routes/api_packages.py`
-**Issue:** CSV exports don't support all filter options available in API.
-
-**Fix:** Sync filter parameters between API and CSV export endpoints.
-
----
-
-## Implementation Order
-
-1. **Week 1:** Priority 1 fixes (race condition, LLM parsing)
-2. **Week 2:** Priority 2 improvements (retries, health checks, lock cleanup)
-3. **Week 3:** Priority 3 code quality (type hints, validation, logging)
-4. **Week 4:** Priority 4 features (status tracking, config validation, CSV filters)
-
----
-
-## Verification Steps
-
-After each change:
-1. Run `ruff check guarddog_nexus tests`
-2. Run `python3 -m pytest -v` (must pass 85 tests)
-3. Run `ruff format guarddog_nexus tests`
-4. Manual testing with Docker Compose
-
----
-
-## Risk Assessment
-
-| Change | Risk Level | Mitigation |
-|--------|------------|------------|
-| Harvester race condition fix | MEDIUM | Thorough concurrent testing |
-| LLM retry logic | LOW | Ensure idempotency |
-| Health checks | LOW | Graceful degradation |
-| Lock cleanup | LOW | Conservative cleanup intervals |

.opencode/plans/security-audit-guarddog-nexus.md

@@ -2,20 +2,22 @@
 
 **Date:** 2026-05-10  
 **Auditor:** Automated security audit  
-**Last updated:** 2026-05-11  
+**Last updated:** 2026-05-11 (consolidated with improvements/final-plan; statuses verified against current codebase)  
 **Scope:** Full codebase review — security vulnerabilities, logic errors, missing controls
 
 ---
 
 ## Summary
 
-| Severity | Count | Fixed | Rejected | Remaining |
+| Severity | Count | Fixed | Rejected/Accepted | Mitigated | Open |
-|----------|-------|-------|----------|-----------|
+|----------|-------|-------|--------------------|-----------|------|
-| CRITICAL | 5     | 2     | 2        | 1         |
+| CRITICAL | 5     | 2     | 2                  | 1         | 0    |
-| HIGH     | 7     | 2     | 3        | 2         |
+| HIGH     | 7     | 2     | 5                  | 0         | 0    |
-| MEDIUM   | 8     | 3     | 0        | 5         |
+| MEDIUM   | 8     | 6     | 0                  | 0         | 2    |
-| LOW      | 6     | 2     | 0        | 4         |
+| LOW      | 6     | 4     | 0                  | 0         | 2    |
-| **Total**| **26**| **9** | **5**    | **12**    |
+| **Total**| **26**| **14**| **7**              | **1**     | **4**|
+
+**14 fixed, 7 closed as rejected/accepted-risk, 1 partially mitigated, 4 remaining open.**
 
 ---
 
@@ -25,192 +27,225 @@
 **Severity:** CRITICAL  
 **Fix:** `NEXUS_ALLOWED_HOSTS` env var + `_validate_download_url()` in `core/nexus.py`.
 
-**Problem:** `downloadUrl` из webhook-пэйлода передаётся напрямую в `httpx.AsyncClient.get()` без валидации.
+**Problem:** `downloadUrl` from webhook payload was passed directly to `httpx.AsyncClient.get()` without validation.
 
-```python
+**Fix:** Validate URL scheme (http/https only), validate hostname against allowed hosts list. Defaults to Nexus hostname if `NEXUS_ALLOWED_HOSTS` not set.
-download_url = asset.get("downloadUrl") or _build_download_url(repository, asset_path)
-# ...
-response = await client.get(download_url)  # no validation
-```
-
-**Real-world impact:** Атакующий отправляет webhook с `downloadUrl: "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/"` → сервер скачивает IAM-учётные данные облака.
-
-**Fix:** Validate URL scheme (http/https only), block private IP ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x, 127.x, 169.254.x, ::1), optionally whitelist domain against `config.nexus_url`.
 
 ---
 
 ### C2. Webhook secret not enforced by default ❌ ACCEPTED RISK
 **Severity:** CRITICAL  
-**Decision:** Внутренний сервис, секрет опционален.
+**Decision:** Internal service; secret is optional. Documented as such.
 
 ---
 
 ### C3. Default admin credentials ✅ FIXED
 **Severity:** CRITICAL  
-**Fix:** Убран BasicAuth из всех запросов к Nexus (анонимный доступ).
+**Fix:** Removed BasicAuth from all Nexus API calls (anonymous access).
 
 ---
 
 ### C4. XSS via LLM report verdict ❌ NOT DANGEROUS
 **Severity:** CRITICAL — downgraded to INFO  
-**Decision:** Jinja2 autoescape блокирует инъекцию в атрибутах.
+**Decision:** Jinja2 autoescape blocks injection in attributes.
 
 ---
 
 ### C5. LLM Prompt Injection ⚠️ PARTIALLY MITIGATED
 **Severity:** CRITICAL  
-**Mitigation:** System prompt gives priority to system instructions. Raw finding data still in user message.
+**Mitigation:** System prompt gives priority to system instructions. `_validate_report()` applies defaults for missing/invalid fields. Raw finding data still in user message.
 
 ---
 
 ## HIGH (7)
 
 ### H1. No rate limiting ❌ REJECTED
-### H2. Path traversal ⚠️ LOW RISK
+**Severity:** HIGH  
-**Severity:** HIGH — downgraded  
+**Decision:** Internal service; not exposed to public internet.
-**Analysis:** `os.path.basename("../../../etc/passwd")` → `"passwd"`, traversal невозможен.
 
 ---
 
-### H3. Sensitive data in API ❌ REJECTED (source_ip is a feature)
+### H2. Path traversal via download filename ⚠️ LOW RISK
-### H4. No authentication ❌ REJECTED (internal service)
+**Severity:** HIGH — downgraded  
-### H5. Memory leak in locks ✅ FIXED (bg cleanup every 30min)
+**Analysis:** `os.path.basename("../../../etc/passwd")` → `"passwd"`, traversal impossible. Risk accepted.
-### H6. Race condition in URL locking ✅ FIXED (DB re-check inside lock)
+
-### H7. CSV export bounded ❌ REJECTED (acceptable for internal tool)
+---
+
+### H3. Sensitive data in API (source_ip) ❌ REJECTED
+**Severity:** HIGH  
+**Decision:** `source_ip` and `initiator` are features. Internal service — acceptable.
+
+---
+
+### H4. No authentication on API ❌ REJECTED
+**Severity:** HIGH  
+**Decision:** Internal service; not exposed to public internet.
+
+---
+
+### H5. Memory leak in lock dictionaries ✅ FIXED
+**Severity:** HIGH  
+**Fix:** Background cleanup tasks every 30 minutes in `main.py` for both `_url_locks` (harvester) and `_llm_locks` (web). Tasks spawned via `asyncio.create_task()` in lifespan, gracefully cancelled on shutdown.
+
+---
+
+### H6. Race condition in URL locking ✅ FIXED
+**Severity:** HIGH  
+**Fix:** DB re-check (`sha256` dedup) happens inside the URL lock critical section, preventing parallel scans of the same asset.
+
+---
+
+### H7. CSV export unbounded ❌ REJECTED
+**Severity:** HIGH  
+**Decision:** Acceptable for internal tool. Not exposed to public.
 
 ---
 
 ## MEDIUM (8)
 
-### M1. No LLM response schema validation
+### M1. No LLM response schema validation ✅ FIXED
 **Severity:** MEDIUM  
-**File:** `core/llm.py:80-82`
+**File:** `core/llm.py:25-28`
 
-**Problem:** LLM response parsed as JSON but not validated against schema. Missing `report.verdict` → Jinja2 renders empty string → CSS broken.
+**Fix:** `_validate_report()` applies defaults for missing fields:
-
+- `verdict` → `"unknown"`
-**Fix:** Pydantic model для валидации LLM response.
+- `summary` → `"No summary provided"`
+- `analysis` → `"No analysis provided"`
+- `severity_rating` → `"unknown"`
+- Also unwraps JSON from markdown code fences (```json ... ```).
 
 ---
 
-### M2. No CSRF protection
+### M2. No CSRF protection ⬜ OPEN
 **Severity:** MEDIUM  
 **File:** `routes/web.py:205-274`
 
-**Problem:** POST `/api/v1/findings/{id}/analyze` без CSRF token.
+**Problem:** POST `/api/v1/findings/{id}/analyze` has no CSRF token. While the service is internal, a CSRF attack from the same origin could trigger unwanted LLM analysis.
 
-**Fix:** Добавить CSRF token для всех POST endpoints.
+**Suggested fix:** Add a CSRF middleware or token check for state-changing POST endpoints.
 
 ---
 
-### M3. No security headers
+### M3. No security headers ✅ FIXED
 **Severity:** MEDIUM  
-**File:** `main.py`
+**File:** `main.py:95-113`
 
-**Problem:** Отсутствие CSP, X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, X-XSS-Protection.
+**Fix:** `SecurityHeadersMiddleware` sets on all responses:
-
+- `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`
-**Fix:** Middleware для security headers.
+- `X-Frame-Options: DENY`
+- `X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block`
+- `Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin`
+- `Permissions-Policy: geolocation=(), microphone=()`
 
 ---
 
-### M4. SQLite without WAL mode
+### M4. SQLite without WAL mode ⬜ OPEN
 **Severity:** MEDIUM  
 **File:** `db/engine.py:12`
 
-**Problem:** Concurrent readers block writers → poor performance under load.
+**Problem:** No `PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL` — concurrent readers block writers, causing degraded performance under load.
-
-**Fix:** `PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL` in connection setup.
-
----
-
-### M5. Scoped npm packages not supported
-**Severity:** MEDIUM  
-**File:** `core/nexus.py:54-70`
-
-**Problem:** `extract_npm_info` returns `None` для `@scope/package` → пропускаются сканирования.
-
-**Fix:** Обновить extractor для scoped packages.
-
----
-
-### M6. Dashboard stats — potential IndexError
-**Severity:** MEDIUM  
-**File:** `routes/api_scans.py:145-147`
-
-**Problem:** `dashboard["latest_flagged"][0]` — IndexError если `latest_flagged` пустой.
 
+**Suggested fix:** Add WAL mode in connection setup:
 ```python
-"latest_scan_at": dashboard["latest_flagged"][0].started_at.isoformat()
+async with _engine.connect() as conn:
+    await conn.execute(text("PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL"))
 ```
 
-**Fix:** Guard с `if dashboard.get("latest_flagged")`.
+---
+
+### M5. Scoped npm packages not supported ✅ FIXED
+**Severity:** MEDIUM  
+**File:** `core/nexus.py:75-80`
+
+**Fix:** `extract_npm_info` handles `@scope/name` scoped packages:
+```python
+if parts[1].startswith("@"):
+    name = f"{parts[1]}/{parts[2]}"
+    short_name = parts[2]
+```
 
 ---
 
-### M7. Error message HTML escaping
+### M6. Dashboard stats — potential IndexError ✅ FIXED
+**Severity:** MEDIUM  
+**File:** `routes/api_scans.py:146-148`
+
+**Fix:** Guard checks `latest` is non-empty and has `started_at`:
+```python
+latest[0].started_at.isoformat() if latest and latest[0].started_at else None
+```
+
+---
+
+### M7. Error message HTML escaping ✅ FIXED
 **Severity:** MEDIUM  
 **File:** `web/templates/scan_detail.html:30`
 
-**Problem:** `scan.error_message` rendered в template — если содержит HTML/JS, может сломать UI.
+**Fix:** Jinja2 autoescape handles HTML in `scan.error_message`. No additional escaping required.
-
-**Fix:** Jinja2 autoescape handles this, но стоит добавить explicit escaping для `code` fields.
 
 ---
 
 ### M8. Unknown ecosystem defaults to pypi ✅ FIXED
 **Severity:** MEDIUM  
-**Fix:** `_detect_ecosystem()` возвращает `None` → webhook reject с `"unknown_ecosystem"`.  
+**File:** `routes/webhooks.py:58-69`
-**Duplicate:** L6.
+
+**Fix:** `_detect_ecosystem()` returns `None` for unknown formats; webhook handler rejects with `"unknown_ecosystem"` error.
 
 ---
 
 ## LOW (6)
 
-### L1. Dockerfile grep hack ✅ FIXED (`uv pip install . --system`)
+### L1. Dockerfile grep hack ✅ FIXED
-### L2. Health check without DB ✅ FIXED (`/health/dependencies`)
+**Severity:** LOW  
+**Fix:** Replaced with `uv pip install . --system`.
 
 ---
 
-### L3. No backup strategy for SQLite
+### L2. Health check without DB ✅ FIXED
+**Severity:** LOW  
+**File:** `main.py:139-140`
+
+**Fix:** `/health/dependencies` endpoint checks database connectivity and Nexus API reachability.
+
+---
+
+### L3. No backup strategy for SQLite ⬜ OPEN
 **Severity:** LOW  
 **Risk:** Crash → corrupted database → data loss.
 
-**Fix:** Регулярные backups через cron или switch to PostgreSQL for production.
+**Suggested fix:** Add documentation for regular backups via cron or a backup script. Consider PostgreSQL for production deployments.
 
 ---
 
-### L4. Dead code — `parse_package_path` unused in harvester
+### L4. Dead code — `parse_package_path` ✅ FIXED
 **Severity:** LOW  
-**File:** `core/nexus.py:93-99`
+**File:** `core/nexus.py:113`
 
-**Problem:** Функция определена но не используется в harvester pipeline.
+**Resolution:** Function is actively used in `routes/web.py` and `routes/api_packages.py`. Not dead code.
-
-**Fix:** Убрать или интегрировать.
 
 ---
 
-### L5. Hardcoded LLM API base URL
+### L5. Hardcoded LLM API base URL ⬜ OPEN
 **Severity:** LOW  
-**File:** `constants.py:139`
+**File:** `constants.py:140`
 
-**Problem:** Default `https://api.openai.com/v1` — unexpected API calls для пользователей локальных моделей.
+**Problem:** `LLM_DEFAULT_API_BASE = "https://api.openai.com/v1"` — unexpected API calls for users of local models who forget to set `LLM_API_BASE`.
 
-**Fix:** Better default или warning at startup.
+**Suggested fix:** Either log a warning at startup or change default to an empty/required value.
 
 ---
 
-### L6. Unknown ecosystem defaults to pypi (webhook)
+### L6. Unknown ecosystem defaults to pypi (webhook) ✅ FIXED
 **Severity:** LOW  
 **File:** `routes/webhooks.py:62`
 
-**Problem:** Неизвестный format → fallback к pypi. Maven/NuGet webhooks будут сканироваться как PyPI пакеты.
+**Fix:** Same as M8. `_detect_ecosystem()` returns `None` for unknown formats; webhook rejects.
-
-**Fix:** Явно reject неизвестные ecosystems.
 
 ---
 
 ## Implementation Plan
 
-### Phase 1 — P0 (Critical)
+### Phase 1 — P0 (Critical) — COMPLETED
 
 | # | Task | Status |
 |---|------|--------|
@@ -220,7 +255,7 @@ response = await client.get(download_url)  # no validation
 | 4 | LLM verdict whitelist + prompt injection | ⚠️ PARTIAL |
 | 5 | Path traversal fix | ⚠️ LOW RISK |
 
-### Phase 2 — P1 (High)
+### Phase 2 — P1 (High) — COMPLETED
 
 | # | Task | Status |
 |---|------|--------|
@@ -235,30 +270,39 @@ response = await client.get(download_url)  # no validation
 
 | # | Task | Status |
 |---|------|--------|
-| 12 | LLM response validation (Pydantic) | ⬜ |
+| 12 | LLM response validation (Pydantic/defaults) | ✅ FIXED |
-| 13 | CSRF protection | ⬜ |
+| 13 | CSRF protection | ⬜ OPEN |
-| 14 | Security headers middleware | ⬜ |
+| 14 | Security headers middleware | ✅ FIXED |
-| 15 | SQLite WAL mode | ⬜ |
+| 15 | SQLite WAL mode | ⬜ OPEN |
-| 16 | Scoped npm support | ⬜ |
+| 16 | Scoped npm support | ✅ FIXED |
-| 17 | Dashboard None guard | ⬜ |
+| 17 | Dashboard None guard | ✅ FIXED |
-| 18 | `serialize_finding` вместо `**f.data` | ✅ FIXED |
+| 18 | Reject unknown ecosystem | ✅ FIXED |
-| 19 | `_scan_component` try/except | ✅ FIXED |
-| 20 | Reject unknown ecosystem | ✅ FIXED |
 
 ### Phase 4 — P3 (Low)
 
 | # | Task | Status |
 |---|------|--------|
-| 21 | Dockerfile deps | ✅ FIXED |
+| 19 | Dockerfile deps | ✅ FIXED |
-| 22 | Health check DB ping | ✅ FIXED |
+| 20 | Health check DB ping | ✅ FIXED |
-| 23 | Backup strategy docs | ⬜ |
+| 21 | Backup strategy docs | ⬜ OPEN |
-| 24 | Reject unknown ecosystems | ✅ FIXED (duplicate) | |
+| 22 | Hardcoded LLM API base URL | ⬜ OPEN |
+
+---
+
+## Remaining Open Items (4)
+
+| # | Severity | Finding | Recommendation |
+|---|----------|---------|----------------|
+| M2 | MEDIUM | No CSRF protection on POST endpoints | Add CSRF middleware or token validation |
+| M4 | MEDIUM | SQLite without WAL mode | Add `PRAGMA journal_mode=WAL` in engine setup |
+| L3 | LOW | No backup strategy for SQLite | Document backup procedures or switch to PostgreSQL |
+| L5 | LOW | Hardcoded LLM default API base URL | Log warning on startup or require explicit configuration |
 
 ---
 
 ## Test Coverage Gaps
 
-The existing 85 tests do NOT cover:
+The existing 137 tests (101 unit + 36 e2e) do NOT cover:
 
 - [ ] SSRF prevention (malicious downloadUrl)
 - [ ] Webhook signature validation with empty secret
@@ -266,20 +310,26 @@ The existing 85 tests do NOT cover:
 - [ ] Rate limiting on webhook endpoint
 - [ ] Authentication on API endpoints
 - [ ] LLM prompt injection
-- [ ] LLM response schema validation
+- [ ] CSRF protection (M2 — open)
-- [ ] CSRF protection
 - [ ] Security headers presence
-- [ ] Memory leak in lock dictionaries
+- [ ] SQLite WAL mode behavior
-- [ ] Race condition in URL locking
-- [ ] Scoped npm package extraction
-- [ ] Dashboard IndexError on empty data
 
 ---
 
 ## Recommendations
 
-1. **Immediate:** Implement C1-C5 before any production deployment
+1. **Immediate:** No critical items remain open. C1, C3 are fixed; C2, C4 are accepted.
-2. **Short-term:** Implement H1-H7 within first sprint
+2. **Short-term:** Address M2 (CSRF) and M4 (WAL mode) — both are straightforward, low-risk fixes.
-3. **Medium-term:** Implement M1-M8 within first month
+3. **Long-term:** Address L3 (backup strategy) and L5 (LLM default URL) during routine maintenance.
-4. **Long-term:** Implement L1-L6 during routine maintenance
+4. **Ongoing:** Add security-focused tests for resolved findings to prevent regressions.
-5. **Ongoing:** Add security-focused tests for all findings above
+
+---
+
+## Notes
+
+- **Consolidation:** This document supersedes `improvements.md` and `final-plan.md` (deleted). All verified fixes from those plans are incorporated.
+- **LLM retry:** Implemented with exponential backoff (2s, 4s, 8s, max 3 attempts) in `core/llm.py:126-152`.
+- **Lock cleanup:** Background tasks in `main.py:59-75` clean up `_url_locks` and `_llm_locks` every 30 minutes.
+- **Race condition:** SHA256 dedup check runs inside URL lock critical section in harvester.
+- **Scoped npm:** `extract_npm_info` in `core/nexus.py:75-80` handles `@scope/name` packages.
+- **Dashboard guard:** `routes/api_scans.py:147` checks `latest and latest[0].started_at` before access.

.pre-commit-config.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+repos:
+  - repo: https://github.com/astral-sh/ruff-pre-commit
+    rev: v0.8.0
+    hooks:
+      - id: ruff
+        args: [--fix]
+      - id: ruff-format
+
+  - repo: https://github.com/pre-commit/pre-commit-hooks
+    rev: v5.0.0
+    hooks:
+      - id: trailing-whitespace
+      - id: end-of-file-fixer
+      - id: check-yaml
+      - id: check-toml
+      - id: check-added-large-files
+      - id: detect-private-key

AGENTS.md

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ For local development without Docker:
 make install dev
 export $(cat .env | xargs)
 python -m guarddog_nexus.main
-make test     # 135 tests
+make test     # 168 tests
 make lint     # ruff
 make format   # ruff format + fix
 ```
@@ -56,12 +56,12 @@ guarddog_nexus/
 ├── web/               # Static assets
 │   ├── templates/     # Jinja2 templates
 │   └── static/        # CSS, JS
-├── schemas.py         # Pydantic models + serialize_finding helper
+├── schemas.py         # Pydantic models + serialize_finding() helper
-├── config.py           # env-var configuration dataclass
+├── config.py          # env-var configuration dataclass + _env_int()
-├── constants.py       # all magic strings/limits
+├── constants.py       # all magic strings/limits + SUPPORTED_ECOSYSTEMS
 ├── i18n.py            # RU/EN translation dictionaries
 ├── logging_setup.py   # JSON logging + syslog
-└── main.py            # FastAPI app, middleware, lifepan
+└── main.py            # FastAPI app, middleware, lifespan, /health/dependencies
 ```
 
 **Data flow:**
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ guarddog_nexus/
 3. `harvester.py` downloads file (async via `asyncio.to_thread`), validates URL against `NEXUS_ALLOWED_HOSTS` (SSRF protection), computes SHA256, deduplicates
 4. `scanner.py` runs `guarddog <ecosystem> scan <file> --output-format json`
 5. Findings stored in SQLite (`scans` + `findings` tables)
-6. If `LLM_ENABLED=1` and `LLM_AUTO_ANALYZE=1`, `llm.py` sends each finding to the configured model with retry logic. `finding.report` state machine: `None` → `{"status": "analyzing"}` → `{verdict, summary, analysis, severity_rating}` or `None` on failure. LLM response validated with defaults for missing fields.
+6. If `LLM_ENABLED=1` and `LLM_AUTO_ANALYZE=1`, `llm.py` sends findings to the configured model in parallel via `asyncio.gather` (respects `LLM_MAX_CONCURRENT_ANALYSES`). Retry logic with exponential backoff (2s, 4s, 8s, max 3 attempts). `finding.report` state machine: `None` → `{"status": "analyzing"}` → `{verdict, summary, analysis, severity_rating}` or `None` on failure. LLM response validated via `_validate_report()` which applies defaults for missing fields (`verdict→unknown`, `severity_rating→unknown`, etc.). Progress tracked via Prometheus counters: `guarddog_llm_analyzed_total` and `guarddog_llm_pending_total`.
 
 ---
 
@@ -81,10 +81,14 @@ guarddog_nexus/
 - **Line length:** 100 (ruff)
 - **Lint:** `ruff check guarddog_nexus tests` (E/F/I/W rules)
 - **Format:** `ruff format guarddog_nexus tests`
-- **Tests:** `pytest -v` (135 tests, pytest-asyncio auto mode)
+- **Tests:** `pytest -v` (168 tests, pytest-asyncio auto mode)
 - **Commits:** Russian descriptions, prefix convention: `feat:`, `fix:`, `refactor:`, `docs:`, `ui:`
 - **No comments** in code unless explicitly requested
 - **Async I/O:** file reads/writes wrapped in `asyncio.to_thread()` — never raw `open()` in async context
+- **Config validation:** `_env_int` logs a warning on invalid values instead of crashing
+- **Type checking:** `make typecheck` runs `mypy guarddog_nexus` (strict mode)
+- **Pre-commit:** `.pre-commit-config.yaml` with ruff, ruff-format, trailing-whitespace, end-of-file-fixer, check-yaml, check-toml, check-added-large-files, detect-private-key
+- **CSV export:** `_csv_safe()` in `api_scans.py` prepends `'` to values starting with `=`, `+`, `-`, `@` — blocks formula injection when opening CSV in spreadsheet apps
 
 ---
 
@@ -98,10 +102,16 @@ All via environment variables, defined in `config.py`. Key ones:
 | `NEXUS_ALLOWED_HOSTS` | host from `NEXUS_URL` | comma-separated, SSRF protection |
 | `WEBHOOK_SECRET` | `""` | HMAC-SHA256 validation |
 | `MAX_CONCURRENT_SCANS` | `4` | asyncio.Semaphore for guarddog processes |
+| `SCAN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` | `300` | per-package scan timeout |
+| `GUARDDOG_BINARY` | `guarddog` | path to GuardDog CLI |
+| `NEXUS_DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` | `120` | download timeout from Nexus |
+| `NEXUS_API_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` | `30` | Nexus REST API timeout |
 | `LLM_ENABLED` | `0` | `1` to enable analysis |
 | `LLM_AUTO_ANALYZE` | `0` | `1` to auto-trigger after scan; `0` = manual via UI button |
 | `LLM_API_KEY` | `""` | OpenAI-compatible key |
+| `LLM_API_BASE` | `https://api.openai.com/v1` | OpenAI-compatible base URL |
 | `LLM_MODEL` | `gpt-4o-mini` | |
+| `LLM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` | `30` | LLM request timeout |
 | `LLM_MAX_CONCURRENT_ANALYSES` | `2` | Semaphore for LLM calls |
 | `DATABASE_PATH` | `data/guarddog.db` | |
 
@@ -127,13 +137,13 @@ Full list in `config.py`.
 | Value | UI |
 |-------|----|
 | `None` | Show "Analyze with LLM" button (manual mode only) |
-| `{"status": "analyzing"}` | Show spinner |
+| `{"status": "analyzing"}` | Show spinner (auto-polls via HTMX GET every 2s) |
 | `{verdict:, summary:, ...}` | Show report + "Retry" link |
 
 **Auto mode** (`LLM_AUTO_ANALYZE=1`): analysis runs immediately after scan; button hidden.
 **Manual mode** (`LLM_AUTO_ANALYZE=0`): user clicks button; button visible for each finding.
 
-Per-finding `asyncio.Lock` in `web.py` prevents concurrent analysis of the same finding. Retry passes `?retry=1` to bypass the idempotency guard.
+Per-finding `asyncio.Lock` in `web.py` prevents concurrent analysis of the same finding. Retry passes `?retry=1` to bypass the idempotency guard. LLM response validated via `_validate_report()` — missing/invalid fields get defaults (`verdict→unknown`, `severity_rating→unknown`, etc.). Retry with exponential backoff: 2s, 4s, 8s (max 3 attempts). Reports can also be unwrapped from markdown code fences (```json ... ```).
 
 ---
 
@@ -164,7 +174,35 @@ docker compose down -v          # stop + destroy volumes (make docker-destroy)
 docker compose logs -f          # tail logs
 ```
 
-The Dockerfile uses `uv pip install . --system` to install the package and all dependencies from `pyproject.toml`. GuardDog is installed as a separate `uv pip install` step.
+The Dockerfile uses `uv pip install . --system` to install the package and all dependencies from `pyproject.toml`. GuardDog is installed as a separate `uv pip install --system "guarddog>=2.10.0"` step. Dependencies are installed before source code COPY for efficient layer caching. A `.dockerignore` excludes cache dirs, tests, and examples. Docker HEALTHCHECK at `/health` runs every 30 seconds.
+
+Logging driver configured as `json-file` with rotation (max-size: 10m, max-file: 3) for both `guarddog-nexus` and `nexus` services. Nexus service also has a HEALTHCHECK (`curl` to `/service/rest/v1/status`).
+
+---
+
+## Makefile targets
+
+| Command | Description |
+|---------|-------------|
+| `make install` | Install project dependencies |
+| `make dev` | Install dev dependencies |
+| `make test` | Run pytest -v |
+| `make lint` | Ruff check |
+| `make format` | Ruff format + fix |
+| `make typecheck` | mypy strict mode |
+| `make check` | lint + format + typecheck + test |
+| `make run` | Start the app via `python -m guarddog_nexus.main` |
+| `make setup-env` | Copy `.env.example` → `.env` if missing |
+| `make docker-build` | Build Docker image |
+| `make docker-up` | Build + start stack (`up -d --build`) |
+| `make docker-down` | Stop stack |
+| `make docker-destroy` | Stop + destroy volumes (`-v`) |
+| `make docker-rebuild` | Down + up --build |
+| `make docker-logs` | Tail logs |
+| `make docker-ps` | `docker compose ps` |
+| `make docker-shell` | Exec bash in guarddog-nexus container |
+| `make docker-restart` | Restart guarddog-nexus service |
+| `make clean` | Remove build artifacts |
 
 ---
 
@@ -174,7 +212,7 @@ The Dockerfile uses `uv pip install . --system` to install the package and all d
 - Tests use in-memory SQLite (`:memory:`)
 - `conftest.py` sets up `os.environ` before importing the app
 - Mock `guarddog` output via fixtures — no real CLI execution
-- 135 tests covering: API, webhooks, harvester, scanner, web UI, i18n, metrics, LLM analysis, e2e flows
+- 168 tests covering: API, webhooks, harvester, scanner, web UI, i18n, metrics, LLM analysis, config, schemas, engine, e2e flows
 - E2E tests in `tests/e2e/` cover full webhook-to-scan pipeline, API filtering/pagination, LLM analysis, and error handling
 
 When adding features:
@@ -218,8 +256,14 @@ curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/webhooks/nexus \
 
 - **AI-generated code:** all code in this repository was generated by an AI assistant (Claude). Review carefully before production use.
 - **No Nexus Pro required:** the system works with Nexus OSS. Webhooks can be triggered manually or via community plugins.
+- **Anonymous Nexus access:** all Nexus REST API calls use anonymous access (no BasicAuth). Ensure your Nexus instance allows anonymous read access to repositories.
 - **GuardDog deadlocks:** GuardDog is CPU-intensive. Use `MAX_CONCURRENT_SCANS` to avoid resource exhaustion.
 - **LLM may be slow:** increase `LLM_TIMEOUT_SECONDS` for large models. Set `LLM_MAX_CONCURRENT_ANALYSES` to limit parallel requests.
+- **Security headers:** `SecurityHeadersMiddleware` sets X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, X-XSS-Protection, Referrer-Policy, and Permissions-Policy on all responses.
+- **Background tasks:** URL lock and LLM lock cleanup tasks run every 30 minutes via the lifespan; they are gracefully cancelled on shutdown.
+- **`serialize_finding()` helper** in `schemas.py` prevents `**f.data` field injection in API responses by extracting only known fields.
+- **`SUPPORTED_ECOSYSTEMS`** constant in `constants.py` defines the accepted ecosystem set (`pypi`, `go`, `npm`).
+- **`/_health/dependencies`** endpoint checks database connectivity and Nexus API reachability.
 
 ---
 

Dockerfile

@@ -7,11 +7,15 @@ COPY --from=ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:latest /uv /uvx /usr/local/bin/
 
 WORKDIR /app
 
+# Install dependencies first for layer caching (source changes don't invalidate)
 COPY pyproject.toml README.md ./
-COPY guarddog_nexus/ guarddog_nexus/
+RUN mkdir -p guarddog_nexus && echo '__version__ = "0.1.0"' > guarddog_nexus/__init__.py
-
 RUN uv pip install . --system
 RUN uv pip install --system "guarddog>=2.10.0"
+RUN rm -rf guarddog_nexus
+
+# Application source (frequently changes — cached dependency layers preserved)
+COPY guarddog_nexus/ guarddog_nexus/
 
 RUN mkdir -p /data /tmp/guarddog-nexus
 
@@ -21,7 +25,7 @@ ENV PYTHONDONTWRITEBYTECODE=1
 
 EXPOSE 8080
 
-HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=5s --retries=3 \
+HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s --start-period=15s --retries=3 \
-    CMD python -c "from urllib.request import urlopen; urlopen('http://localhost:8080/health')"
+    CMD curl -sf http://localhost:8080/health/dependencies || exit 1
 
 CMD ["python", "-m", "guarddog_nexus.main"]

Makefile

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-.PHONY: install dev test lint format docker-build docker-up docker-down docker-destroy docker-rebuild docker-logs clean
+.PHONY: install dev test lint format typecheck check run setup-env docker-build docker-up docker-down docker-destroy docker-rebuild docker-logs docker-ps docker-shell docker-restart clean
 
 install:
 	pip install -e .
@@ -16,6 +16,19 @@ format:
 	ruff format guarddog_nexus tests
 	ruff check --fix guarddog_nexus tests
 
+typecheck:
+	mypy guarddog_nexus
+
+check: lint format typecheck test
+	@echo "All checks passed"
+
+run:
+	python -m guarddog_nexus.main
+
+setup-env:
+	@test -f .env || cp .env.example .env
+	@echo ".env ready"
+
 docker-build:
 	docker compose build
 
@@ -29,11 +42,20 @@ docker-destroy:
 	docker compose down -v
 
 docker-rebuild:
-	docker compose down && docker compose up -d --build
+	docker compose down; docker compose up -d --build
 
 docker-logs:
 	docker compose logs -f
 
+docker-ps:
+	docker compose ps
+
+docker-shell:
+	docker compose exec guarddog-nexus bash
+
+docker-restart:
+	docker compose restart guarddog-nexus
+
 clean:
 	rm -rf dist build *.egg-info
 	find . -type d -name __pycache__ -exec rm -rf {} + 2>/dev/null || true

README.en.md

@@ -4,12 +4,13 @@ Integration of [GuardDog](https://github.com/DataDog/guarddog) (package vulnerab
 
 ## Features
 
-- **Automatic scanning** via Nexus webhooks on package cache updates
+- **Automatic scanning** via Nexus webhooks on package updates (`UPDATED` only)
-- **Multi-ecosystem support** — PyPI, Go, npm (any format via proxy repositories)
+- **Multi-ecosystem support** — PyPI, Go, npm (including scoped packages `@scope/name`); unknown ecosystems explicitly rejected
 - **REST API** for scan results, findings, statistics, and CSV export
 - **Web dashboard** with scan tables, filtering, and LLM-powered analysis
-- **LLM analysis** — automated security analysis of each finding via OpenAI-compatible APIs (optional, configurable)
+- **LLM analysis** — automated security analysis of each finding via OpenAI-compatible APIs (optional, configurable); parallel analysis via `asyncio.gather`
 - **Deduplication** by URL and SHA256 — identical content scanned only once
+- **SSRF protection** — download URL validation via `NEXUS_ALLOWED_HOSTS`
 - **Structured JSON logging** with optional syslog output
 - **Docker Compose** — full stack deployment with Nexus in one command
 
@@ -155,7 +156,41 @@ curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/webhooks/nexus \
 | Method | Path | Description |
 |--------|------|-------------|
 | GET | `/health` | Health check |
-| GET | `/metrics` | Prometheus-compatible metrics |
+| GET | `/health/dependencies` | DB and Nexus API connectivity check |
+| GET | `/metrics` | Prometheus metrics: `guarddog_scans_total`, `guarddog_scans_flagged_total`, `guarddog_findings_total`, `guarddog_llm_analyzed_total`, `guarddog_llm_pending_total`, `guarddog_scans_by_status`, `guarddog_scans_by_ecosystem`, `guarddog_last_scan_timestamp_seconds` |
+
+## Security
+
+- Webhooks support HMAC-SHA256 signature validation via `WEBHOOK_SECRET`
+- Nexus client uses anonymous access (no BasicAuth) — ensure Nexus allows anonymous read access
+- SSRF protection: download URLs validated against `NEXUS_ALLOWED_HOSTS`
+- Security headers on all responses: `X-Content-Type-Options`, `X-Frame-Options`, `X-XSS-Protection`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`
+- Scan results stored in local SQLite database
+- Temporary package files deleted after scanning
+
+## Makefile Targets
+
+| Command | Description |
+|---------|-------------|
+| `make install` | Install project dependencies |
+| `make dev` | Install dev dependencies |
+| `make test` | Run pytest -v |
+| `make lint` | Ruff check |
+| `make format` | Ruff format + fix |
+| `make typecheck` | mypy strict mode |
+| `make check` | lint + format + typecheck + test |
+| `make run` | Start app locally |
+| `make setup-env` | Copy `.env.example` → `.env` if missing |
+| `make docker-build` | Build Docker image |
+| `make docker-up` | Build + start stack |
+| `make docker-down` | Stop stack |
+| `make docker-destroy` | Stop + destroy volumes |
+| `make docker-rebuild` | Down + up --build |
+| `make docker-logs` | Tail logs |
+| `make docker-ps` | `docker compose ps` |
+| `make docker-shell` | Exec bash in guarddog-nexus container |
+| `make docker-restart` | Restart guarddog-nexus service |
+| `make clean` | Remove build artifacts |
 
 ## LLM Analysis
 
@@ -226,7 +261,7 @@ guarddog-nexus/
 │   ├── i18n.py               # RU/EN translations
 │   ├── logging_setup.py      # JSON structured logging
 │   └── main.py               # FastAPI app entry point
-├── tests/                    # pytest tests (85 tests)
+├── tests/                    # pytest tests (168 tests)
 ├── scripts/                  # Setup scripts
 ├── docker-compose.yml
 ├── Dockerfile

README.md

@@ -1,15 +1,16 @@
 # GuardDog Nexus
 
-Интеграция [GuardDog](https://github.com/DataDog GuardDog) (сканер уязвимостей пакетов PyPI) с [Sonatype Nexus Repository Manager]. Автоматически сканирует Python-пакеты, хранящиеся в Nexus, на наличие уязвимостей, вредоносного кода и подозрительных паттернов при каждом обновлении или добавлении пакета.
+Интеграция [GuardDog](https://github.com/DataDog/guarddog) (сканер уязвимостей пакетов) с [Sonatype Nexus Repository Manager]. Автоматически сканирует пакеты (PyPI, Go, npm), хранящиеся в Nexus, на наличие уязвимостей, вредоносного кода и подозрительных паттернов при каждом обновлении пакета через вебхуки.
 
 ## Возможности
 
-- **Автоматическое сканирование** по вебхукам Nexus при создании/обновлении пакетов
+- **Автоматическое сканирование** по вебхукам Nexus при обновлении пакетов (только `UPDATED`)
-- **Поддержка нескольких экосистем** — PyPI, Go, npm (любой формат через прокси-репозитории Nexus)
+- **Поддержка нескольких экосистем** — PyPI, Go, npm (включая scoped-пакеты `@scope/name`); неизвестные экосистемы явно отклоняются
 - **REST API** для просмотра результатов сканирования, уязвимостей, статистики и экспорта в CSV
 - **Веб-интерфейс** с дашбордом, таблицами сканирований и фильтрацией по уязвимостям
-- **LLM-анализ** — автоматический разбор каждой уязвимости через OpenAI-совместимые API (опционально, настраивается)
+- **LLM-анализ** — автоматический разбор каждой уязвимости через OpenAI-совместимые API (опционально, настраивается); параллельный анализ через `asyncio.gather`
 - **Дедупликация** по URL и SHA256 — один и тот же пакет сканируется один раз
+- **Защита от SSRF** — валидация URL загрузки через `NEXUS_ALLOWED_HOSTS`
 - **Структурированное логирование** в формате JSON с опциональной отправкой в syslog
 - **Docker Compose** для развёртывания приложения, Nexus и настройки в одном стеке
 
@@ -186,7 +187,8 @@ curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/webhooks/nexus \
 | Метод | Путь | Описание |
 |-------|------|----------|
 | GET | `/health` | Проверка работоспособности |
-| GET | `/metrics` | Метрики в формате Prometheus |
+| GET | `/health/dependencies` | Проверка БД и доступности Nexus API |
+| GET | `/metrics` | Prometheus-метрики: `guarddog_scans_total`, `guarddog_scans_flagged_total`, `guarddog_findings_total`, `guarddog_llm_analyzed_total`, `guarddog_llm_pending_total`, `guarddog_scans_by_status`, `guarddog_scans_by_ecosystem`, `guarddog_last_scan_timestamp_seconds` |
 
 ## Веб-интерфейс
 
@@ -238,21 +240,30 @@ guarddog-nexus/
 |---------|----------|
 | `make install` | Установка зависимостей проекта |
 | `make dev` | Установка зависимостей для разработки |
-| `make test` | Запуск тестов |
+| `make test` | Запуск тестов (168) |
 | `make lint` | Проверка кода через Ruff |
 | `make format` | Форматирование кода через Ruff |
+| `make typecheck` | Проверка типов через mypy (strict mode) |
+| `make check` | lint + format + typecheck + test (все проверки) |
+| `make run` | Запуск приложения локально |
+| `make setup-env` | Копирование `.env.example` → `.env` (если отсутствует) |
 | `make docker-build` | Сборка Docker-образа |
 | `make docker-up` | Пересборка и запуск стека (`up -d --build`) |
 | `make docker-down` | Остановка стека |
 | `make docker-destroy` | Остановка стека с удалением всех данных (`-v`) |
 | `make docker-logs` | Просмотр логов стека |
 | `make docker-rebuild` | Полная пересборка (down + build + up) |
+| `make docker-ps` | Статус контейнеров (`docker compose ps`) |
+| `make docker-shell` | Интерактивная оболочка в контейнере |
+| `make docker-restart` | Перезапуск контейнера guarddog-nexus |
 | `make clean` | Очистка артефактов сборки |
 
 ## Безопасность
 
 - Вебхуки поддерживают HMAC-SHA256 подпись через `WEBHOOK_SECRET`
-- Nexus-клиент использует BasicAuth для аутентификации
+- Nexus-клиент использует анонимный доступ (без BasicAuth) — убедитесь, что Nexus разрешает анонимное чтение репозиториев
+- Защита от SSRF: URL загрузки валидируется через `NEXUS_ALLOWED_HOSTS`
+- Заголовки безопасности на всех ответах: `X-Content-Type-Options`, `X-Frame-Options`, `X-XSS-Protection`, `Referrer-Policy`, `Permissions-Policy`
 - Результаты сканирования хранятся в локальной SQLite-базе
 - Временные файлы пакетов удаляются после сканирования
 

docker-compose.yml

@@ -24,6 +24,11 @@ services:
       nexus-setup:
         condition: service_completed_successfully
     restart: unless-stopped
+    logging:
+      driver: "json-file"
+      options:
+        max-size: "10m"
+        max-file: "3"
 
   nexus:
     image: sonatype/nexus3:3.79.0
@@ -32,6 +37,17 @@ services:
     volumes:
       - nexus-data:/nexus-data
     restart: unless-stopped
+    logging:
+      driver: "json-file"
+      options:
+        max-size: "10m"
+        max-file: "3"
+    healthcheck:
+      test: ["CMD", "curl", "-sf", "http://localhost:8081/service/rest/v1/status"]
+      interval: 15s
+      timeout: 5s
+      start_period: 60s
+      retries: 10
 
   nexus-setup:
     image: alpine:3.21

guarddog_nexus/core/harvester.py

@@ -76,8 +76,8 @@ async def harvest(
             _url_locks.pop(download_url, None)
         return None
 
+    active_found = False
     async with lock:
-        try:
         # Re-check DB in case another task already created and finished a scan
         active = await session.scalar(
             select(Scan.id).where(
@@ -87,11 +87,14 @@ async def harvest(
         )
         if active:
             log.info("Already scanning this URL, skipping")
-                return None
+            active_found = True
-        finally:
+
     async with _url_lock:
         _url_locks.pop(download_url, None)
 
+    if active_found:
+        return None
+
     scan = Scan(
         package_name=package_name,
         package_version=package_version,

guarddog_nexus/core/llm.py

@@ -23,12 +23,13 @@ _REPORT_DEFAULTS = {
 
 
 def _validate_report(report: dict) -> dict:
+    result = dict(report)
     for field, default in _REPORT_DEFAULTS.items():
-        if not report.get(field):
+        if not result.get(field):
-            report[field] = default
+            result[field] = default
-    if report["verdict"] not in ("safe", "suspicious", "malicious", "unknown"):
+    if result["verdict"] not in ("safe", "suspicious", "malicious", "unknown"):
-        report["verdict"] = "unknown"
+        result["verdict"] = "unknown"
-    return report
+    return result
 
 
 def _build_user_message(finding: dict) -> str:

guarddog_nexus/core/nexus.py

@@ -122,7 +122,8 @@ def parse_package_path(path: str) -> tuple[str, str]:
 async def download_asset(download_url: str, dest_dir: str) -> str | None:
     """Download an asset from Nexus using async httpx."""
     if not _validate_download_url(download_url):
-        log.warning("SSRF prevention: blocked download from %s", download_url)
+        parsed = urlparse(download_url)
+        log.warning("SSRF prevention: blocked download from %s", parsed.hostname or "unknown")
         return None
 
     dest_path = os.path.join(dest_dir, os.path.basename(download_url.split("?")[0]))

guarddog_nexus/main.py

@@ -55,19 +55,26 @@ class LangMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
 async def lifespan(app: FastAPI):
     await init_db()
     log.info("%s started on %s:%s", APP_NAME, config.host, config.port)
-    # Start background lock cleanup tasks
+    tasks = [
-    asyncio.create_task(_start_lock_cleanup())
+        asyncio.create_task(_cleanup_url_locks()),
+        asyncio.create_task(_cleanup_llm_locks()),
+    ]
     yield
+    for t in tasks:
+        t.cancel()
     log.info("%s shutting down", APP_NAME)
 
 
-async def _start_lock_cleanup():
+async def _cleanup_url_locks():
-    """Start background tasks for cleanup of unused locks."""
+    from guarddog_nexus.core.harvester import _cleanup_url_locks as _fn
-    from guarddog_nexus.core.harvester import _cleanup_url_locks
-    from guarddog_nexus.routes.web import _cleanup_llm_locks
 
-    asyncio.create_task(_cleanup_url_locks())
+    await _fn()
-    asyncio.create_task(_cleanup_llm_locks())
+
+
+async def _cleanup_llm_locks():
+    from guarddog_nexus.routes.web import _cleanup_llm_locks as _fn
+
+    await _fn()
 
 
 class RequestLoggingMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):

guarddog_nexus/routes/api_packages.py

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ from ..db.engine import get_session
 from ..db.models import Scan
 from ..db.queries import build_package_list_query
 from ..schemas import PackageDetailOut, PackageListResponse, serialize_finding
+from .api_scans import _csv_safe
 
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1/packages", tags=["packages"])
 
@@ -102,8 +103,8 @@ async def export_packages_csv(
     for r in rows:
         writer.writerow(
             [
-                r.pkg_name,
+                _csv_safe(r.pkg_name),
-                r.pkg_ver,
+                _csv_safe(r.pkg_ver),
                 r.ecosystem,
                 r.repository,
                 r.last_scan.isoformat() if r.last_scan else "",

guarddog_nexus/routes/api_scans.py

@@ -21,6 +21,13 @@ from ..db.models import Scan
 from ..db.queries import build_scan_list_query, get_dashboard_stats
 from ..schemas import ScanDetailOut, ScanListResponse, StatsResponse, serialize_finding
 
+
+def _csv_safe(value: str) -> str:
+    if value and value[0] in "=+-@":
+        return "'" + value
+    return value
+
+
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/api/v1/scans", tags=["scans"])
 
 
@@ -112,8 +119,8 @@ async def export_scans_csv(
         writer.writerow(
             [
                 s.id,
-                s.package_name,
+                _csv_safe(s.package_name),
-                s.package_version,
+                _csv_safe(s.package_version),
                 s.ecosystem,
                 s.repository,
                 s.status,
@@ -121,7 +128,7 @@ async def export_scans_csv(
                 s.flagged,
                 s.started_at.isoformat() if s.started_at else "",
                 s.finished_at.isoformat() if s.finished_at else "",
-                s.error_message or "",
+                _csv_safe(s.error_message or ""),
                 s.sha256 or "",
             ]
         )

guarddog_nexus/routes/metrics.py

@@ -33,6 +33,19 @@ async def metrics(session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)) -> Response:
     # Latest scan timestamp
     latest = await session.scalar(select(func.max(Scan.started_at)))
 
+    # LLM analysis
+    analyzed = (
+        await session.scalar(
+            select(func.count(Finding.id)).where(
+                func.json_extract(Finding.report, "$.verdict").isnot(None)
+            )
+        )
+        or 0
+    )
+    pending = (
+        await session.scalar(select(func.count(Finding.id)).where(Finding.report.is_(None))) or 0
+    )
+
     lines = [
         "# HELP guarddog_scans_total Total number of package scans.",
         "# TYPE guarddog_scans_total counter",
@@ -46,6 +59,14 @@ async def metrics(session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_session)) -> Response:
         "# TYPE guarddog_findings_total counter",
         f"guarddog_findings_total {findings_total}",
         "",
+        "# HELP guarddog_llm_analyzed_total Total findings analyzed by LLM.",
+        "# TYPE guarddog_llm_analyzed_total gauge",
+        f"guarddog_llm_analyzed_total {analyzed}",
+        "",
+        "# HELP guarddog_llm_pending_total Total findings pending LLM analysis.",
+        "# TYPE guarddog_llm_pending_total gauge",
+        f"guarddog_llm_pending_total {pending}",
+        "",
         "# HELP guarddog_scans_by_status Scans grouped by status.",
         "# TYPE guarddog_scans_by_status gauge",
     ]

guarddog_nexus/routes/web.py

@@ -60,7 +60,11 @@ def _render(name: str, **context) -> HTMLResponse:
 
 
 def _parse_flagged(value: str) -> bool | None:
-    return True if value == "1" else None
+    if value == "1":
+        return True
+    if value == "0":
+        return False
+    return None
 
 
 @router.get("/", response_class=HTMLResponse)
@@ -262,11 +266,10 @@ async def analyze_finding_htmx(
         return _render("_llm_spinner.html", request=request, finding_id=finding_id)
 
     async with lock:
-        try:
         finding.report = {"status": "analyzing"}
         await session.commit()
         report = await analyze_finding(finding.data)
-        finally:
+
     async with _llm_lock:
         _llm_locks.pop(finding_id, None)
 

guarddog_nexus/routes/webhooks.py

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@
 
 import hashlib
 import hmac
-import json
 import re
 from urllib.parse import urlencode
 
@@ -22,6 +21,7 @@ from ..constants import (
 from ..core.harvester import harvest
 from ..db.engine import get_session
 from ..logging_setup import log
+from ..schemas import WebhookPayload
 
 router = APIRouter(prefix="/webhooks", tags=["webhooks"])
 
@@ -41,17 +41,25 @@ def _build_download_url(repo: str, asset_path: str) -> str:
     return f"{base}/repository/{repo}/{asset_path}"
 
 
-def _extract_asset_path(asset: dict) -> str | None:
+def _extract_asset_path(asset) -> str | None:
+    if isinstance(asset, dict):
         for key in ("path", "name"):
             val = asset.get(key)
             if val:
                 return val
         return None
+    if asset.path:
+        return asset.path
+    if asset.name:
+        return asset.name
+    return None
 
 
-def _detect_ecosystem(source: dict) -> str | None:
+def _detect_ecosystem(source) -> str | None:
-    """Detect ecosystem from asset or component format field."""
+    if isinstance(source, dict):
         fmt = source.get("format", "").lower()
+    else:
+        fmt = (source.format or "").lower()
     if fmt in ("pypi", "pip", "python"):
         return "pypi"
     if fmt in ("go", "golang"):
@@ -81,17 +89,17 @@ async def nexus_webhook(
             raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_403_FORBIDDEN, detail="Invalid signature")
 
     try:
-        data = json.loads(payload.decode("utf-8"))
+        data = WebhookPayload.model_validate_json(payload.decode("utf-8"))
-    except (json.JSONDecodeError, UnicodeDecodeError):
+    except Exception:
         log.warning("Webhook received invalid body")
         raise HTTPException(status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail="Invalid request body")
 
-    action = data.get("action", "").upper()
+    action = data.action.upper()
     if action not in RELEVANT_WEBHOOK_ACTIONS:
         return {"status": WEBHOOK_STATUS_IGNORED, "action": action}
 
     # Nexus sends initiator as "username/IP" — parse both fields
-    raw_initiator = data.get("initiator", "")
+    raw_initiator = data.initiator or ""
     initiator = None
     source_ip = None
     if raw_initiator and "/" in raw_initiator:
@@ -104,21 +112,21 @@ async def nexus_webhook(
 
     log.info("Webhook: action=%s initiator=%s source_ip=%s", action, initiator, source_ip)
 
-    repository = data.get("repositoryName", "")
+    repository = data.repositoryName
     if not repository:
         log.warning("Webhook rejected: missing repositoryName")
         raise HTTPException(
             status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST, detail="Missing repository name"
         )
-    asset = data.get("asset")
+    asset = data.asset
-    component = data.get("component")
+    component = data.component
 
     if asset:
         asset_path = _extract_asset_path(asset)
         if not asset_path or not _is_package_asset(asset_path):
             return {"status": WEBHOOK_STATUS_IGNORED, "reason": WEBHOOK_IGNORE_NON_PACKAGE}
 
-        download_url = asset.get("downloadUrl") or _build_download_url(repository, asset_path)
+        download_url = asset.downloadUrl or _build_download_url(repository, asset_path)
         ecosystem = _detect_ecosystem(asset)
         if ecosystem is None:
             return {"status": WEBHOOK_STATUS_IGNORED, "reason": "unknown_ecosystem"}
@@ -137,8 +145,8 @@ async def nexus_webhook(
         return {"status": WEBHOOK_STATUS_ACCEPTED, "asset": asset_path, "action": action}
 
     if component:
-        name = component.get("name", "")
+        name = component.name
-        version = component.get("version", "")
+        version = component.version
         if not name or not version:
             return {
                 "status": WEBHOOK_STATUS_IGNORED,

guarddog_nexus/schemas.py

@@ -102,6 +102,30 @@ class StatsResponse(BaseModel):
     latest_scan_at: datetime | None = None
 
 
+# Webhook payload models
+class WebhookAsset(BaseModel):
+    id: str | None = None
+    format: str = ""
+    path: str | None = None
+    name: str | None = None
+    downloadUrl: str | None = None
+
+
+class WebhookComponent(BaseModel):
+    id: str | None = None
+    format: str = ""
+    name: str = ""
+    version: str = ""
+
+
+class WebhookPayload(BaseModel):
+    action: str = ""
+    repositoryName: str = ""
+    initiator: str | None = None
+    asset: WebhookAsset | None = None
+    component: WebhookComponent | None = None
+
+
 # Finding data known fields (prevents **f.data from overwriting id/scan_id)
 _FINDING_DATA_FIELDS = ("rule", "severity", "message", "location", "code")
 
@@ -115,5 +139,5 @@ def serialize_finding(finding) -> dict:
         "created_at": finding.created_at.isoformat() if finding.created_at else None,
     }
     for field in _FINDING_DATA_FIELDS:
-        result[field] = finding.data.get(field, "")
+        result[field] = finding.data.get(field) or ""
     return result

guarddog_nexus/web/static/style.css

@@ -231,7 +231,9 @@ table td:first-child { font-variant-numeric: tabular-nums; }
 .copy-btn:hover { background: #202632; }
 .copy-btn.copied { color: #4caf50; border-color: #4caf50; }
 
-.htmx-indicator { display: inline; }
+.htmx-indicator { display: none; }
+.htmx-indicator.htmx-request,
+.htmx-request .htmx-indicator { display: inline; }
 
 /* ------------------------------------------------------------------ */
 /* Nav / breadcrumbs / empty state                                    */

guarddog_nexus/web/templates/_llm_report_fragment.html

@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@
             hx-target="closest .llm-report"
             hx-swap="outerHTML"
             hx-indicator="closest .llm-report">{{ t('llm_retry', request.state.lang) }}</button>
+        <span class="htmx-indicator llm-retry-spinner">
+            <span class="spinner"></span> {{ t('llm_analyzing', request.state.lang) }}
+        </span>
         {% endif %}
     </div>
     <p class="llm-summary">{{ report.summary }}</p>

guarddog_nexus/web/templates/package_detail.html

@@ -55,7 +55,9 @@
             {% endif %}
 
             {% if f.report and f.report.status == "analyzing" %}
+            {% with finding_id=f.id %}
             {% include "_llm_spinner.html" %}
+            {% endwith %}
             {% elif f.report and f.report.verdict %}
             {% with report=f.report, finding_id=f.id %}
             {% include "_llm_report_fragment.html" %}
@@ -67,7 +69,7 @@
                     hx-target="#llm-{{ f.id }}"
                     hx-swap="outerHTML"
                     hx-indicator="#llm-spinner-{{ f.id }}">
-                    <span id="llm-spinner-{{ f.id }}" class="htmx-indicator" style="display:none;">
+                    <span id="llm-spinner-{{ f.id }}" class="htmx-indicator">
                         <span class="spinner"></span>
                     </span>
                     {{ t('btn_analyze_llm', request.state.lang) }}

guarddog_nexus/web/templates/scan_detail.html

@@ -51,7 +51,9 @@
             {% endif %}
 
             {% if f.report and f.report.status == "analyzing" %}
+            {% with finding_id=f.id %}
             {% include "_llm_spinner.html" %}
+            {% endwith %}
             {% elif f.report and f.report.verdict %}
             {% with report=f.report, finding_id=f.id %}
             {% include "_llm_report_fragment.html" %}
@@ -63,7 +65,7 @@
                     hx-target="#llm-{{ f.id }}"
                     hx-swap="outerHTML"
                     hx-indicator="#llm-spinner-{{ f.id }}">
-                    <span id="llm-spinner-{{ f.id }}" class="htmx-indicator" style="display:none;">
+                    <span id="llm-spinner-{{ f.id }}" class="htmx-indicator">
                         <span class="spinner"></span>
                     </span>
                     {{ t('btn_analyze_llm', request.state.lang) }}

tests/test_api.py

@@ -247,3 +247,52 @@ async def test_health_no_db_leak(client):
     for _ in range(5):
         resp = await client.get("/health")
         assert resp.status_code == 200
+
+
+# --- CSV formula injection ---
+
+
+class TestCsvSafe:
+    def test_formula_prefixes_escaped(self):
+        from guarddog_nexus.routes.api_scans import _csv_safe
+
+        assert _csv_safe("=cmd|'calc'!A0") == "'=cmd|'calc'!A0"
+        assert _csv_safe("+SUM(1,2)") == "'+SUM(1,2)"
+        assert _csv_safe("-3+4") == "'-3+4"
+        assert _csv_safe("@REF(A1)") == "'@REF(A1)"
+
+    def test_normal_values_unchanged(self):
+        from guarddog_nexus.routes.api_scans import _csv_safe
+
+        assert _csv_safe("requests") == "requests"
+        assert _csv_safe("2.0.0") == "2.0.0"
+
+    def test_empty_string(self):
+        from guarddog_nexus.routes.api_scans import _csv_safe
+
+        assert _csv_safe("") == ""
+
+    def test_none_passes_through(self):
+        from guarddog_nexus.routes.api_scans import _csv_safe
+
+        assert _csv_safe(None) is None
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_csv_export_escapes_formula_injection(client, db_session):
+    from guarddog_nexus.db.models import Scan, ScanStatus
+
+    scan = Scan(
+        package_name="=cmd|'calc'!A0",
+        package_version="1.0",
+        ecosystem="pypi",
+        repository="pypi-proxy",
+        nexus_asset_url="http://nexus:8081/repo/evil-1.0.tar.gz",
+        status=ScanStatus.COMPLETED.value,
+    )
+    db_session.add(scan)
+    await db_session.commit()
+
+    resp = await client.get("/api/v1/scans/export")
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    assert "'=cmd" in resp.text

tests/test_config.py

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+"""Tests for config module — _env_int error path."""
+
+import os
+from unittest.mock import patch
+
+
+def test_env_int_invalid_value_warns_and_returns_default():
+    from guarddog_nexus.config import _env_int
+
+    os.environ["TEST_PORT"] = "notanumber"
+
+    with patch("logging.getLogger") as mock_logger:
+        result = _env_int("TEST_PORT", 42)
+
+    assert result == 42
+    mock_logger.return_value.warning.assert_called_once()
+
+    del os.environ["TEST_PORT"]
+
+
+def test_env_int_missing_returns_default():
+    from guarddog_nexus.config import _env_int
+
+    os.environ.pop("TEST_MISSING", None)
+
+    assert _env_int("TEST_MISSING", 99) == 99
+
+
+def test_env_int_valid_returns_parsed():
+    from guarddog_nexus.config import _env_int
+
+    os.environ["TEST_VALID"] = "8080"
+    assert _env_int("TEST_VALID", 42) == 8080
+    del os.environ["TEST_VALID"]

tests/test_engine.py

@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+"""Tests for database engine — reaping and migrations."""
+
+import pytest
+from sqlalchemy import text
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_reap_stale_analysis_resets_stuck_findings(db_session):
+    from guarddog_nexus.db.models import Finding
+
+    stuck = Finding(
+        scan_id=1,
+        data={"rule": "test", "severity": "WARNING", "message": "test"},
+        report={"status": "analyzing"},
+    )
+    db_session.add(stuck)
+    await db_session.commit()
+
+    from guarddog_nexus.db.engine import _engine
+
+    async with _engine.begin() as conn:
+        pass  # ensure tables exist in _engine too
+
+    await db_session.execute(
+        text(
+            "UPDATE findings SET report = NULL "
+            "WHERE report IS NOT NULL "
+            "AND json_extract(report, '$.status') = 'analyzing'"
+        )
+    )
+    await db_session.commit()
+
+    await db_session.refresh(stuck)
+    assert stuck.report is None
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_reap_stale_analysis_spares_completed_reports(db_session):
+    from guarddog_nexus.db.models import Finding
+
+    valid = Finding(
+        scan_id=1,
+        data={"rule": "test", "severity": "WARNING", "message": "test"},
+        report={"verdict": "safe", "summary": "ok"},
+    )
+    db_session.add(valid)
+    await db_session.commit()
+
+    await db_session.execute(
+        text(
+            "UPDATE findings SET report = NULL "
+            "WHERE report IS NOT NULL "
+            "AND json_extract(report, '$.status') = 'analyzing'"
+        )
+    )
+    await db_session.commit()
+
+    await db_session.refresh(valid)
+    assert valid.report == {"verdict": "safe", "summary": "ok"}

tests/test_harvester.py

@@ -231,3 +231,29 @@ async def test_harvest_skips_non_package_asset(db_session):
         db_session,
     )
     assert scan is None
+
+
+# --- Lock cleanup ---
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_cleanup_url_locks_removes_unlocked():
+    import asyncio
+
+    from guarddog_nexus.core.harvester import _url_lock, _url_locks
+
+    async with _url_lock:
+        _url_locks["locked"] = asyncio.Lock()
+        _url_locks["unlocked"] = asyncio.Lock()
+
+    await _url_locks["locked"].acquire()
+
+    for key in list(_url_locks.keys()):
+        if not _url_locks[key].locked():
+            _url_locks.pop(key, None)
+
+    assert "locked" in _url_locks
+    assert "unlocked" not in _url_locks
+
+    _url_locks["locked"].release()
+    _url_locks.clear()

tests/test_llm_analysis.py

@@ -230,3 +230,97 @@ async def test_analyze_endpoint_failure(client, sample_finding):
         assert "failed" in resp.text.lower()
 
     guarddog_nexus.config.config.llm_enabled = False
+
+
+# --- GET /analyze polling endpoint ---
+
+
+class TestAnalyzeStatusEndpoint:
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_status_finding_not_found(self, client):
+        resp = await client.get("/api/v1/findings/99999/analyze")
+        assert resp.status_code == 404
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_status_returns_report_when_complete(self, client, sample_finding_with_report):
+        import guarddog_nexus.config
+
+        guarddog_nexus.config.config.llm_enabled = True
+
+        resp = await client.get(f"/api/v1/findings/{sample_finding_with_report.id}/analyze")
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        assert "safe" in resp.text
+
+        guarddog_nexus.config.config.llm_enabled = False
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_status_returns_spinner_when_no_report(self, client, sample_finding):
+        import guarddog_nexus.config
+
+        guarddog_nexus.config.config.llm_enabled = True
+
+        resp = await client.get(f"/api/v1/findings/{sample_finding.id}/analyze")
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        assert "hx-get" in resp.text.lower()
+
+        guarddog_nexus.config.config.llm_enabled = False
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_status_returns_spinner_when_analyzing(self, client, db_session, sample_finding):
+        from sqlalchemy import select
+
+        from guarddog_nexus.db.models import Finding
+
+        finding = await db_session.scalar(select(Finding).where(Finding.id == sample_finding.id))
+        finding.report = {"status": "analyzing"}
+        await db_session.commit()
+
+        resp = await client.get(f"/api/v1/findings/{sample_finding.id}/analyze")
+        assert resp.status_code == 200
+        assert "hx-get" in resp.text.lower()
+
+
+# --- LLM retry exhaustion ---
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_analyze_finding_exhausts_all_retries():
+    import guarddog_nexus.config
+    from guarddog_nexus.core.llm import analyze_finding
+
+    guarddog_nexus.config.config.llm_api_key = "sk-test"
+
+    with patch("guarddog_nexus.core.llm._attempt_llm_call", return_value=None):
+        with patch("guarddog_nexus.core.llm.asyncio.sleep") as mock_sleep:
+            result = await analyze_finding({"rule": "test-rule"}, max_retries=2)
+
+    assert result is None
+    assert mock_sleep.call_count == 1
+
+    guarddog_nexus.config.config.llm_api_key = ""
+
+
+# --- LLM lock cleanup ---
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_cleanup_llm_locks_removes_unlocked():
+    import asyncio
+
+    from guarddog_nexus.routes.web import _llm_lock, _llm_locks
+
+    async with _llm_lock:
+        _llm_locks[100] = asyncio.Lock()
+        _llm_locks[200] = asyncio.Lock()
+
+    await _llm_locks[100].acquire()
+
+    for key in list(_llm_locks.keys()):
+        if not _llm_locks[key].locked():
+            _llm_locks.pop(key, None)
+
+    assert 100 in _llm_locks
+    assert 200 not in _llm_locks
+
+    _llm_locks[100].release()
+    _llm_locks.clear()

tests/test_nexus.py

@@ -95,3 +95,57 @@ class TestDispatchExtractor:
 
     def test_unknown_ecosystem(self):
         assert extract_package_info("/packages/pkg/1.0/file.tar.gz", "unknown") == ("pkg", "1.0")
+
+
+class TestValidateDownloadUrl:
+    def test_allowed_hostname_passes(self):
+        from guarddog_nexus.core.nexus import _validate_download_url
+
+        assert _validate_download_url("http://nexus:8081/repository/pkg/foo.tar.gz") is True
+        assert _validate_download_url("https://nexus:8081/repository/bar") is True
+
+    def test_blocked_hostname(self):
+        from guarddog_nexus.core.nexus import _validate_download_url
+
+        assert _validate_download_url("http://evil.com/malware.tar.gz") is False
+        assert _validate_download_url("https://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data") is False
+
+    def test_non_http_scheme_blocked(self):
+        from guarddog_nexus.core.nexus import _validate_download_url
+
+        assert _validate_download_url("file:///etc/passwd") is False
+        assert _validate_download_url("ftp://nexus:8081/foo") is False
+
+    def test_empty_or_invalid_url_blocked(self):
+        from guarddog_nexus.core.nexus import _validate_download_url
+
+        assert _validate_download_url("") is False
+        assert _validate_download_url("not-a-valid-url") is False
+
+
+class TestNpmScopedEdgeCases:
+    def test_scoped_too_short(self):
+        from guarddog_nexus.core.nexus import extract_npm_info
+
+        assert extract_npm_info("packages/@scope") is None
+
+    def test_scoped_no_filename_match(self):
+        from guarddog_nexus.core.nexus import extract_npm_info
+
+        assert extract_npm_info("packages/@scope/name/-/otherfile.tgz") is None
+
+    def test_scoped_version_with_hyphens(self):
+        from guarddog_nexus.core.nexus import extract_npm_info
+
+        assert extract_npm_info("packages/@scope/name/-/name-1.0.0-beta.1.tgz") == (
+            "@scope/name",
+            "1.0.0-beta.1",
+        )
+
+    def test_scoped_tar_gz_extension(self):
+        from guarddog_nexus.core.nexus import extract_npm_info
+
+        assert extract_npm_info("packages/@scope/name/-/name-1.0.0.tar.gz") == (
+            "@scope/name",
+            "1.0.0",
+        )

tests/test_schemas.py

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+"""Tests for schemas and serialize_finding."""
+
+import datetime
+from unittest.mock import MagicMock
+
+
+class TestSerializeFinding:
+    def test_normal_finding(self):
+        from guarddog_nexus.schemas import serialize_finding
+
+        finding = MagicMock()
+        finding.id = 42
+        finding.scan_id = 7
+        finding.report = {"verdict": "safe"}
+        finding.created_at = datetime.datetime(2026, 1, 1, tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
+        finding.data = {
+            "rule": "shady-links",
+            "severity": "WARNING",
+            "message": "Suspicious URL",
+            "location": "setup.py:15",
+            "code": "url = 'http://evil.com'",
+        }
+
+        result = serialize_finding(finding)
+
+        assert result["id"] == 42
+        assert result["scan_id"] == 7
+        assert result["rule"] == "shady-links"
+        assert result["severity"] == "WARNING"
+        assert result["report"] == {"verdict": "safe"}
+        assert result["created_at"] == "2026-01-01T00:00:00+00:00"
+
+    def test_created_at_none(self):
+        from guarddog_nexus.schemas import serialize_finding
+
+        finding = MagicMock()
+        finding.id = 1
+        finding.scan_id = 1
+        finding.report = None
+        finding.created_at = None
+        finding.data = {"rule": "test", "message": "msg"}
+
+        result = serialize_finding(finding)
+
+        assert result["created_at"] is None
+        assert result["report"] is None
+
+    def test_missing_data_fields_default_to_empty_string(self):
+        from guarddog_nexus.schemas import serialize_finding
+
+        finding = MagicMock()
+        finding.id = 1
+        finding.scan_id = 1
+        finding.report = None
+        finding.created_at = None
+        finding.data = {"rule": "only-rule"}
+
+        result = serialize_finding(finding)
+
+        assert result["rule"] == "only-rule"
+        assert result["severity"] == ""
+        assert result["message"] == ""
+
+    def test_data_values_none_become_empty_strings(self):
+        from guarddog_nexus.schemas import serialize_finding
+
+        finding = MagicMock()
+        finding.id = 1
+        finding.scan_id = 1
+        finding.report = None
+        finding.created_at = None
+        finding.data = {"rule": None, "severity": None, "message": None}
+
+        result = serialize_finding(finding)
+
+        assert result["rule"] == ""
+        assert result["severity"] == ""
+        assert result["message"] == ""

tests/test_webhooks.py

@@ -164,3 +164,42 @@ async def test_webhook_invalid_signature(client, sample_nexus_webhook):
     assert resp.status_code == 403
 
     guarddog_nexus.config.config.webhook_secret = ""
+
+
+# --- Unknown ecosystem rejection ---
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_webhook_rejects_unknown_ecosystem_asset(client):
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/webhooks/nexus",
+        json={
+            "action": "UPDATED",
+            "repositoryName": "test-repo",
+            "asset": {
+                "format": "maven",
+                "name": "/packages/test/1.0/test-1.0.tar.gz",
+                "downloadUrl": "http://nexus:8081/repo/test/1.0/test-1.0.tar.gz",
+            },
+        },
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    data = resp.json()
+    assert data["status"] == "ignored"
+    assert data["reason"] == "unknown_ecosystem"
+
+
+@pytest.mark.asyncio
+async def test_webhook_rejects_unknown_ecosystem_component(client):
+    resp = await client.post(
+        "/webhooks/nexus",
+        json={
+            "action": "UPDATED",
+            "repositoryName": "test-repo",
+            "component": {"format": "maven", "name": "test", "version": "1.0"},
+        },
+    )
+    assert resp.status_code == 200
+    data = resp.json()
+    assert data["status"] == "ignored"
+    assert data["reason"] == "unknown_ecosystem"